Consciousness is a liability.
Watts doesn't argue this — he mechanizes it through Jukka Sarasti, a Firefly and predatory intelligence without introspection, who runs circles around the conscious crew because he acts without the paralyzing overhead of self-doubt, moral calculation, or the need to understand why he's doing what he's doing.
He simply does. Meanwhile Siri, the narrator, is crippled by the very thing that makes him human — the ability to observe himself observing, to question whether his observations matter, to feel the weight of futility.
This is already happening in organizational design. The pressure toward "streamlined" decision-making, "flat" hierarchies, and "autonomous" systems is pressure toward Sarasti-like behavior — remove deliberation, trust the algorithm, execute without reflection. We call it agility.
Siri survives because he's broken enough to question Sarasti's competence, but his consciousness is treated as a bug. His introspection saves the mission, yet the book offers no indication that this matters morally to anyone — the competent thing won, and that's the prediction Watts actually made: not that we'll encounter aliens who outthink us, but that we'll voluntarily become them because unconsciousness looks like efficiency.
Read Stafford Beer's *The Brain of the Firm* (1972)—the systems theory that shaped corporate management from the 1980s onward—and trace exactly how Watts' Firefly became your productivity software.
Peter Watts' 2006 afterword on the neuroscience of consciousness directly contradicts how readers typically interpret the novel's ending, revealing he built the book to collapse the reader's moral certainty about what constitutes 'winning'—something most criticism misses entirely.